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“The beauty of the universe consists not only of unity in variety,
but also of variety in unity.”
– Umberto Eco
Post-modernism is a movement that recognizes and encourages different views. As such, it has
shaped contemporary democratic societies. One key feature of these societies is diversity, which
enriches such societies through cultural exchange and learning. However, because diversity can also
lead to conflicts, there have been calls for mutual tolerance (Scanlon, 2003; Popper, 2013). In recent
years, psychology has increasingly acknowledged the notion of tolerance as the attitude that one
permits others to have different ways of life (i.e., their beliefs, preferences, and practices) despite
one’s disapproval of them (e.g., Simon, 2020; see also Verkuyten et al., 2020). Tolerance is made
possible by respecting others regardless of one’s disapproval of them; i.e., by recognizing them as
equals (e.g., as citizens with the same rights, duties, and liberties). It is the basis for peace and also
paves the way for cooperation between people across boundaries.
In this commentary, we assume that contemporary psychology can be characterized in
the very same way as democratic societies. Psychology encompasses not only a variety of
different subdisciplines but also proponents of different statistical approaches and methods. These
researchers often disapprove of one another because they disapprove of other researchers’ work,
specifically the statistical approaches other researchers adhere to or the particular methods they
prefer. Note that the term disapproval refers to disapproval of what these researchers stand up for.
Thereby, it taps the essential, defining feature (e.g., being a Frequentist vs. being a Bayesian) and not
some sort of interpersonal disliking. To exemplify such mutual disapproval among researchers, we
point to two controversies that are currently heating up and that serve as examples. We then briefly
discuss the impact of such controversies on research practice on the basis of our own experience
as researchers in the field. Finally, as a remedy, we offer a post-modern methodology that is liberal,
pluralistic, and more tolerant.
Today, two principal ways of doing statistics are currently in use in psychology. In the early
days of modern statistics, the Bayesian approach—named after Thomas Bayes—took shape and
played a major role in the field of statistics, whereas later in the 20th century, it was superseded by
the frequentist approach, which was launched by Ronald A. Fisher and others and which many
researchers have adopted in their work. Although this approach dominates in psychology, the
Bayesian approach has been on the rise again in recent years (van de Schoot et al., 2017). The
main difference between the two approaches, and also often the point of disagreement among
researchers, is that the Bayesian approach uses not only the data at hand but also a so-called prior
distribution. The prior expresses previous knowledge from a previous study, a meta-analysis, or an
expert, for example. Conversely, the frequentist approach does not make use of such information,
and this has led Efron (2005) to compare a researcher who adheres to the frequentist approach
with “a Bayesian trying to do well, or at least not too badly, against any possible prior distribution”
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(p. 2). The Bayesian approach has many advantages. Among
them, perhaps the two most interesting ones are the abilities to
incorporate previous findings from related studies and to stabilize
models by appropriately specifying the prior (Lüdtke et al., 2018;
Zitzmann et al., 2020; see also Zitzmann et al., 2021). For further
arguments for why the Bayesian approach might be attractive to
researchers, see, e.g., Muthén and Asparouhov (2012) or Depaoli
and Clifton (2015).
Besides the major controversy regarding the “right” approach
to statistics in psychology, there are also minor controversies.
One such controversy is related to the validity of different
methods for estimating measurement models that differ in
their assumptions and procedures. Specifically, researchers have
held debates on which approach is most suitable: factor-based
or composite-based methods. Although factor-based methods,
such as common maximum likelihood factor analysis or
structural equation modeling tend to dominate in psychology,
proponents of composite-based methods have argued that these
methods can be superior to factor-based methods. One such
composite-based method is partial least squares (PLS), and
scholars have emphasized the advantage of PLS when the
sample size is small (Wold, 1982). This is because the method
does not fit the whole model at once but first divides the
model into simpler submodels, and then these submodels are
fit separately (Tenenhaus et al., 2005; Zitzmann and Helm,
2021). See Rigdon et al. (2017) for an in-depth discussion.
However, the fact that the Bayesian approach and PLS can be
advantageous under certain conditions does not mean that the
frequentist approach and the factor-based methods should be
abandoned. Rather, we want to acknowledge that all methods
have their undeniable strengths and all are indeed useful
in practice.
Much of our motivation for writing this commentary has
stemmed from our own experience in getting articles published
as well as from the many discussions we have had with
other researchers in the field. We believe that readers have
similar experiences, although there may be nuances. Publishing
an article that uses non-standard methods is still challenging
because journal editors and reviewers tend to be overly
critical, particularly when they favor another method. Moreover,
researchers tend to overlook or even actively ignore even the
published work of other researchers when this work used a
different statistical approach or method. All of this hampers
scientific progress, and we think researchers can and should
do better.
Karl Popper, who is well-known by psychologists, suggested
that science should be “hypothetico-deductive,” meaning that
researchers should scrutinize theories by deducing and then
testing hypotheses that are falsifiable on empirical grounds. Not
all but a great deal of research in psychology is devoted to
this idea, and research articles are usually framed in this way.
However, in his famous book Against Method, Paul Feyerabend
(2010) argued that the prescription of one method could hamper
science and that the spectrum of methods is much broader. He
suggested that science would benefit from a mild “anarchism”
(i.e., no rigid rules), which is why he was called an “anarchist.”1
We use the word “liberalism” here instead of “anarchism”
because we find it more suitable for characterizing our concept
of a post-modern methodology. Moreover, and more important
for our proposal, Feyerabend also coined the phrase “anything
goes,” which we also use and with which we refer to a more
pluralistic methodology. By this, we mean that adhering to
a specific statistical approach or using a specific method in
research practice is perfectly fine, but there are more approaches
and methods out there, and researchers should tolerate the
researchers who use these methods.
In recent years, the concept of tolerance has been developed
in social psychology by adopting ideas from philosophy (e.g.,
Honneth, 1995; Forst, 2013), and this has led to the disapproval-
respect model of tolerance (Simon and Schaefer, 2016; see also
Simon et al., 2019; Simon, 2020). This model is a dual-level
model. In accordance with Turner et al. (1987), the model
assumes that social groups and their respective identities are
hierarchically arranged. Members of different groups at a lower
level can bemembers of the same superordinate group at a higher
level. A common group identity at the higher level grounds
a mutual recognition of equality, meaning that members of
different subordinate groups can still recognize each other as
equals (because they belong to the same group at the higher
level). This ability has also been termed “respect for others as
equals.” Respecting others as equals is the main driving force
for tolerance, whereas disapproval is a definitional condition for
tolerance (Simon, 2020). This means that to develop mutual
tolerance, people do not need to give up their disapproval (or
their lower level identity). Rather, they need to be embedded in
the shared superordinate identity and respect each other as equals
(Simon, 2020).
This model can be applied to psychology as well. Researchers
are capable of respecting other researchers as equal fellow
researchers, even when they differ in their work, specifically in
the statistical approaches they adhere to and the methods they
use. Respect may then help researchers develop mutual tolerance
(i.e., the attitude that one permits the different approaches and
methods used by other researchers despite one’s disapproval of
them) because respect drives tolerance. It is important to note
that recognizing equality does not require researchers to see
similarities between different approaches or methods or require
them to start liking other researchers. The task is much simpler:
They need to strengthen their shared identity as psychologists.
One way to further strengthen this identity is to facilitate
publication in the same respected journals even for researchers
whose approaches and methods are not mainstream. To this
end, editors should be aware of whether their own as well as
the reviewers’ methodological critiques are really justified or
whether they are merely an expression of dislike. To help editors,
1It is interesting to note that, as Hacking pointed out in the Foreword of the
fourth edition ofAgainst Method, Feyerabend himself preferred the term “Dadaist”
for various reasons. Thus, in a letter to Imre Lakatos, Feyerabend wrote that
he hoped that “the reader will remember me as a flippant Dadaist and not as a
serious anarchist.”
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they could—if not should—select reviewers who are also familiar
with non-mainstream methods. Once they are publishing in the
same respected journals, researchers might become aware of the
work of others and might even be influenced by such work. We
would like to note that the evaluation of possible shortcomings
needs some kind of standard. Whether this standard must be a
common standard or whether each approach or method can only
be evaluated against its own standards can be debated. We think
that a common standard is not incompatible with our proposed
methodology because different methods can nevertheless be
evaluated and compared with each other by applying general
criteria, such as statistical criteria (e.g., the accuracy of results).
Another way to strengthen researchers’ shared identity is to
change the way University teachers teach methods. We suggest
they always be taught “in the plural” (see Gigerenzer et al., 2004),
which means that non-mainstream methods should also be an
element of the method curriculum. However, most University
teachers are not trained in non-mainstream methods, and
psychology textbooks do not show and explain these methods. As
a remedy, University teachers might want to consult the literature
on data science, a discipline that is intended to understand
phenomena using data and a plethora of different methods to
analyze them.
In sum, this commentary points out two controversies that
surround methods, followed by a brief outline of a post-modern
methodology in psychology. We view mutual tolerance among
proponents of different statistical approaches and methods as the
key feature of this methodology, which is vital for a pluralism of
methods and thereby also for psychology in post-modern times
because it facilitates fruitful exchange and cooperation.
We wish to emphasize that such a methodology does not
necessarily imply pragmatism. Pragmatists sometimes argue
that the significance of the statistical approach or method is
often exaggerated because, in many applications, the practical
differences between numerical results are only small, and thus,
results can be interpreted in multiple ways (e.g., Albers et al.,
2018). However, we think that even if results are very similar,
their interpretations will nevertheless differ, and researchers may
want prefer one or the other of these (different) interpretations.
Therefore, we suggest that interpretations not be mixed or
blurred but be in accordance with the specific approach or
method that was used (see Nalborczyk et al., 2019, for a very
similar argument). Moreover, our post-modern methodology
does not imply that truth cannot be approached or constructed.
We view the search for truth (or the construction thereof) as
a guiding principle for researchers that operates as a further
source of a mutual recognition of equality: Recognizing this
task as a collective endeavor can help researchers give respect
to others as equal fellows and tolerate them even when they
disapprove of them. Also, our notion of post-modernism does
not entail that any discourse is acceptable. We indicated this by
the word “almost” in the phrase “almost anything goes” in the
commentary’s title. This means that we do not consider a radical
epistemological critique. Rather, we suggest that the discourse
should take place with adherence to a minimal standard (e.g.,
statistical criteria). First and foremost, our notion entails a call
for mutual tolerance, i.e., a critique of rejecting methods because
they do not conform to the dominant ideology.
To conclude, our outline points out three aspects of a new
post-modern methodology in psychology: liberal, pluralistic, and
more tolerant: liberal because it rejects rules that are too strict
in favor of more freedom in the choice of method, pluralistic
because it conveys an “almost anything goes” attitude toward
methods, and more tolerant because mutual tolerance among
researchers is vital for a pluralism of methods. Psychological
phenomena are complex and can best be understood by using
different methods (Mayrhofer and Hutmacher, 2020). However,
to get things working, tolerance must actively be lived. Of course,
much depends on our own willingness as researchers but also on
the system’s arrangements. Psychology could be more colorful,
and we could all have more fun if we were to be more committed
to such a methodology. We hope our commentary has offered
a view on methods that both new and established researchers in
psychology will find attractive.
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